In the June 1997 issue of the Bulletin, Anand Paranjpe reviewed the proceedings of the IACCP Pamplona congress edited by Hector Grad, Amelio Blanco and Jim Georgas. This reaction has been written at the request of Bulletin Editor, Bill Gabrenya.
The Editor's initiative is understandable. Although Paranjpe avoids taking authors of separate chapters to task, his criticism of the field of culture-comparative research as a whole is rather devastating. Such a position would seem to call for a serious rebuttal, but I am afraid that too often current practices in cross-cultural research are indeed vulnerable to too many of the objections raised. However, one may ask whether Paranjpe's more or less uncritical recommendation of a different orientation on culture and interpretive modes of analysis is a good strategy for our field.
Often I am embarrassed to see how elementary methodological principles of culture-comparative research that were outlined decades ago, notably by the late Donald Campbell, continue to be ignored in contemporary publications. Paranjpe rightly objects to the casual and often ad hoc treatment of "culture" in our field and to the ritualistic use of design and analysis procedures. He also rightly notes the near absence of bias analysis and of designs that have been informed explicitly by canons of (quasi-)experimental research.
The question is to what extent the misapplication or nonapplication of methodological tools can form an objection to these tools per se. Most methodological procedures have been developed for the specific purpose of helping researchers to prevent incorrect interpretations. It is hard to understand why quantitative methodology is chastised by Paranjpe. When research questions are stated appropriately, the experimental design offers a marvellous means to exclude important alternative interpretations for a certain state of affairs. One fine illustration is the study on cognition and literacy conducted by Scribner and Cole (1981) among the Vai. Unless one adheres to a strict relativism where the very existence of an objective reality is questioned, it equally holds that reliability and validity of data in a psychometric sense are necessary requirements for meaningful interpretation. This is independent of whether these data are obtained through standardized tests, interviews, observation, or any other kind of method.
Paranjpe explicitly endorses the use of such methodology which he refers to as quantitative methodology, so the word "chastise" may be too strong. However, the emphasis in his exposé is on a much wider use of what is called qualitative methodology. If the question is how research on matters of behavior and culture has to be conducted, the contrast between qualitative and quantitative is considerably less absolute than often presented. Even strict experimentalists talk about exploratory investigations, pilot studies, and the need for new research to deal with unexplained findings. Moreover, in as much as the dominant tradition of contemporary culture-comparative research is post-positivistic, it does not exclude qualitative methods (cf. for example, Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
For most psychologists the main standard for evaluating the methodological quality of a study remains the extent to which design and analysis allow us to rule out plausible alternative interpretations. Unfortunately, in holistic and hermeneutical analysis with narrative accounts about the phenomena of interest, the issue of validation continues to be an Achilles heel. In the history of our science the insights of psychologists in mental processes time and again have been shown to be beyond substantiation, if not downright wrong. Therefore, methodological standards remain essential in psychological research. In as much as Paranjpe is calling for an alternative methodology his arguments would have been more convincing, if he had also addressed its weaknesses, or indicated why insights derived in this way should be less prone to error.
In the past other sciences have undergone major shifts in the definition of their domain of enquiry, and there is no reason why (cross-cultural) psychology should be immune to this process. Paranjpe suggests such a shift, as illustrated by two statements that were highlighted by the Editor in the margin of the text. The first argues that current research practices "let the very core of the subject matter-culture-slip through our fingers". The other quotation reads: "Much of culture is out of bounds, for we cannot measure wisdom, myths, and other such non-quantifiable-and yet the most important-aspects of culture". Of the two constituents in most definitions of cross-cultural psychology, behavior and culture, Paranjpe emphasizes the latter. Through the introduction of holistic modes of enquiry, he wants to make wisdom and myths understandable. His argument is suggestive both about the future success of this enterprise and about its moral standing.
A striking feature of typical studies as reported in the Pamplona proceedings is the rather small amount of the total variance in many data sets that can be explained in terms of various aspects of culture. We almost invariably report levels of confidence of statistical tests, but if we would calculate which percentage of the total variance should be attributed to aspects of culture the findings often would not be impressive. Thus, I agree with Paranjpe that a case can be made for a reorientation of cross-cultural psychology.
However, the direction for change that Paranjpe indicates is not self-evident. As mentioned, the predominant use of subjective methods is a vulnerable research strategy, because of the lack of methodological controls on interpretation. But there is an even more basic issue. Paranjpe's emphasis on culture-specific analysis of phenomena presumes that there are close relationships between cultural context and psychological process. Evidently, people in different contexts differ in overt and covert behavior, but to what extent does this imply "differing ways of understanding, interpretation and evaluation of issues in human life"? Also, is there integration of cultural patterns as presumed in holistic approaches (culture as a system) in an objective sense, or does this exist mainly in the eye of the beholder? After all, examples from our own literature, like stereotyping (national character) and social attributions, show the fallibility of subjective inferential processes.
Another direction to proceed is a psychological perspective that is informed by culture, but takes equally serious the striking similarities in behavior patterns across the globe. Perhaps a middle ground can be found in the development of theories that do not try to explain or understand the relationships between behavior and culture in greater detail, but that can show us why there are limits to prediction and explanation that cannot be surpassed. One suggestion (that I personally happen to like, see Poortinga 1997) is that we should be informed more by models like chaos theory and catastrophe theory. Such models of nonlinear dynamics make essentially unpredictable changes understandable that take place within law governed systems. The most famous example is the essential unpredictability of the weather beyond a period of a few days. At the same time, chaos and catastrophe are contained within boundaries; the weather in a week's time may be beyond prediction, but in many places one can safely state that no snow will fall in summer.
From such a perspective the limited power of explanation in cross-cultural research that Paranjpe mentions, may also point to similarities in psychological functioning of humans across cultures. The implication is that there was perhaps not that much wrong when the authors of the Pamplona proceedings did their studies within the traditional paradigm of culture-comparative research, although one might wish that they had specified their predictions more precisely, including the expected level of accuracy of these predictions. In other words, the reach of the experimental and psychometric paradigm in cross-cultural psychology may be limited, but perhaps for different reasons as suggested by Paranjpe.
So far I have addressed some theoretical and methodological issues in Paranjpe's review. There are also some more rhetorical comments that may be less relevant, but that are somewhat nagging because of the moral implications. One point is the objection to a "one-way flow from West to East". I agree that indigenization movements are highly desirable. It is embarrassing to admit that cross-cultural psychology, like the whole of psychology, continues to be too much an ethnocentric Western enterprise. However, this is no reason why holistic and culture-specific approaches should offer an intrinsically superior alternative. Authors like Sinha (1997) and Enriquez (1993) who have strongly promoted the indigenization of psychology advocate ultimate convergence towards a culture-informed psychology in a univeralistic fashion.
A second point concerns Paranjpe's objection that donors of data are not referred to as "participants" but as "subjects," indicating "that the psychologists are presumed to be the knowers and the so-called 'subjects' are no more than objects of knowledge and not knowers in their own right". Again, Paranjpe's interpretation may not be the only one. To me the notion of participant carries a misguided suggestion of equality between data donors and researchers. Even when respecting and valuing data donors to the fullest extent, I am dealing with "subjects" or "informants" in the course of research. According to the ethical standards of national psychological associations, at least in Western Europe, my professional responsibility makes me the person who is accountable for the legitimacy and ethical standards of the project.
In summary, there are two aspects to Paranjpe's review, his criticisms of current culture-comparative research and his recommendations of an alternative approach. We should take the criticisms very seriously, but I am not yet convinced that the recommended alternative is the obvious medicine for the infirmities of our field. Perhaps the Pamplona proceedings forms "a respectable volume" for a few more reasons than it has been credited with by Paranjpe.
Enriquez, V. G. (1993). Developing a Filipino psychology. In U. Kim & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context (pp. 152-169). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Poortinga, Y. H. (1997). Towards convergence? In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga & J. Pandey (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology (2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Theory and method, pp. 347- 387). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Scribner, S., & Cole, M. (1981). The psychology of literacy. Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press.
Sinha, D. (1997). Indigenizing psychology. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga & J. Pandey (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology (2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Theory and method, pp. 129- 169). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.